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BOOK REVIEWS 
K oyna Earthquake of December 11, I967: Report of the Expert Committee on Electrical and Mechanical 
Equipment. UNESCO, No. 1489/BMS.RD/SCE, Paris, September, 1969, 52 pp. 
Hydroelectric power generators are common in seismic regions throughout the world and their 
abil ity to withstand earthquakes i important  o public welfare. There is very l itt le information 
in the l i terature about the effects of earthquakes on such instal lations; hence, the report of the 
Expert Committee should be of special interest o all who are responsible for designing and oper- 
ating hydroelectric plants. The report describes what happened at the power stat ion during and 
after the earthquake and makes recommendations for improving the earthquake resistance. The 
magnitude 6.5 earthquake, thought to have been triggered by the reservoir loading, centered 
about 3 km south of the dam. A strong-motion aecelerometer instal led within the 338-ft high, con- 
crete gravity dam recorded a peak acceleration of about 50 per cent g, with the frequencies in the 
motion being appreciably higher than those shown by U. S. earthquakes. The 540-MW electric- 
generating stat ion was located about 8 km WNW of the dam. The effect of the earthquake on the 
dam has been described in a paper by G. V. Berg et al., The Koyna, India Earthquakes,  Proceedings 
of the Fifth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Santiago, Chile, 1969, and also 
in UNESCO Report of the Committee of Experts on Koyna Earthquake of December 11, 1967, New 
Delhi, 1968. The effect of the earthquake on the power generating stat ion is summarized in the 
following description which has been abstracted from the report. 
OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE 
At 04.20 hours on December 11 1967 a severe earthquake of very high intensity caused failure of 
power supply. On observing the severity of the earthquake and the tr ipping of the units, the shift 
engineer on duty opened out the breakers on Bombay lines 1 and 2 and after a few seconds, the 
Karad line breaker also. On failure of the ac auxiliary supply, he tried to start  the house genera- 
tor. The house generator was started by governor-floor operators and the ac supply resumed. In 
the meantime, operators at the governor floor were instructed to stop the units and quit the power- 
house premises. Governor-floor operators on stages I and I I  side, while shutt ing down the units, 
applied brake jets on all of the units, except unit 2 where they kept the air brakes "ON"  at full 
speed. After start ing the house generator, they left the powerhouse. Stage I I  governor-floor opera- 
tots, on receiving instructions from the shift engineer and confirming that  the ac supply was "ON"  
init iated stopping operations of the units. They used brake jets for units 5, 6 and 8 at about 300 
rpm and brakes at 75 rpm; the brake jet could not be used on unit 7, so this was stopped by ap- 
plying brakes from full speed. After the stopping operations were completed, they received a call 
to leave the powerhouse. By this t ime all of the staff had left the powerhouse. 
The first group of maintenance personnel entered the powerhouse at 08.30 hours on December 
11 1967. On the hydraulic equipment, all of the spherical valves were closed, all of the by-pass 
valves were closed and all of the bypass gate valves were open. Opening limiters on units 1 to 4 
were 50 to 80 per cent open. Opening limiters on units 5 to 7 were 0 per cent open. Butterf ly valves 
1 to 4 were open. Air brake valves on units 1 to 4 were open. 
On the electrical side, all of the field breakers and 220-kv breakers were in "OFF"  position, ex- 
cept the 220-kv breaker of unit 4 and Bombay line 2. Cable end isolators of units 5 to 8 and 220-kv 
main bus isolators were open. Bombay line 1 and 2 main bus side isolators were open. All other 
isolators were in normal service position. Compressed air pressure was 0 kg/cm ~ on the 30 kg/cm 2 
system. Bombay line 2 and unit 4 breaker positions were "ON" and air pressure was 0 kg/cm 2. 
All other breakers and tank pressures were between 15 and 15.4 kg/cm 2. Compressors were not 
running, because the main 415-Vac incoming breaker was tripped. The ae supply to carrier cu- 
bicles, air-conditioning plant and l ighting was dead, for the same reason. The converter was 
running and carrier cubicles were in service, fed by the emergency ac supply. 
The unit  boards and the control board indicated that  units 1 through 7 had tripped, that  there 
had been excessive overspeed, that  pressure oil vessel was low and that  pressure container oil level 
was low. The frequency recorder chart indicated that  the system frequency, which was 49.8 eps 
before the s tar t  of the occurrence, var ied from below 48 up to 52 cps and beyond. 
In butterf ly valve 1, the grease on the servomotor shaft  was wiped out, but the valve position 
was open. Tripping could have occurred as a result of shock leakage on the bypass filling in the 
pressure shaft~ so that,  on closing, the air valve automatical ly opened the butterfly valve. 
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Stopping operations for the transformer cooling panels and switchyard isolators were carried 
out afterwards by the maintenance staff. 
All main cooling water pipeline valves were open. Closing operations were carried out by 
maintenance and operation staff on December 13 1967. 
DAMAGE TO PLANT AND EQUIPMENT IN THE POWERHOUSE 
220-Kv C. T. 200/1/1 R ph. for bus coupler bushing had hairl ine crack and oil was leaking. 
33-kv P. T. of 10-MVA transformer was found leaking through gasket. 
Bombay line 2, ABCB phase, "R" hollow column insulator sheared near the ioint between 
first and second column. 
Unit  4, 220-kv ABCB phase, "Y"  hollow column insulator had crack at similar place as Bombay 
line 2 but in bottom column. 
220-kv isolator clamps were loose. 
Bombay line 1, bus side C. T. phase, "Y"  and ABCB structure level disturbed. 
Uni t  5, 6000-amp switch phase "B," one support  insulator cracked. 
Control circuit: some of the connections found loose. One interlock circuit connection came 
out of terminal.  
Some fluorescent l ighting tube fixtures fell down near unit  8 governor floor. 
Relay Room building: one lead acid bat tery  cell found slipped. 
10-MVA transformer moved by 1~ to 1½ in. 
Mechanical. 
South side intake (HRT)  gate servomotor foundation bolts and nuts came out of their seats. 
~Viercury vapor lamps damaged,  lightning arrester on the tower found sheared. 
Lower  and upper guide-bearing adjusting disc pieces of the holding pins of individual pads 
strained and almost all had hairline cracks. 
Shaft and bearing alignments disturbed. 
Auxiliary generator commutator  on units 2 and 3 scratched due to the bending and twisting of 
brush holders. 
Dome lights shattered on units 1 to 4. 
Air-conditioning plant. 
Shaft Mignment disturbed in both  units. 
Starter  contacts and switch contacts of vent i lat ion blower shattered and fell. 
RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS 
Unit  1 was put back on the line at 21 hr, December 13, and unit 3 was on the line the following 
day. Uni t  4 was on the line the 16th, unit 8 on the 19th, unit  2 on the 23rd, unit  5 on the 28th, 
unit  7 on the 29th and unit  6 on the 30th. 
OBSERVATIONS ON DAMAGE AND REPAIR 
Immediately after the earthquake, a prel iminary examination revealed that  the hydraulic 
system as a whole had not suffered any noticeable damage and it was therefore decided to check 
the alignments of the different machines. First, the house generator was started. No appreciable 
change having been found in the al ignment of machine 1, it was started on no-load and kept run- 
ning to watch for any undue temperature ise. After a few hours run without any undue occurrence, 
this machine was taken on load. Subsequently, the other machines were checked one by one and 
tr ied out. 
All eight generators had tr ipped as a result of operations of relays. Their temperature and pily- 
comp records indicated a possibil ity of damage to the thrust  bearings of machines 3 and 4. Subse- 
quent examination of these showed, however, that  they were in perfect condition. 
Examinat ion of the guide bearing adjustments of the four units of stage I revealed that  the 
adjustment discs had been dented and deformed, even though the guide bearings themselves were 
not damaged. For the immediate postearthquake maintenance, these were replaced in "all the units 
by adjustment discs of similar specifications made from material  procured locally. The commuta- 
tor of the auxil iary generators of units 2 and 3 were seen to have been damaged because of the 
rocker arm and the bending and twisting of brush holders. Their commutators had to be resur- 
faced. The bearing bridge level of unit I was found in order. Units 2 and 4 had to be realigned. 
Real ignment was not felt necessary for unit  3. Their  temperature rise after the runs was found to 
be within limits. 
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The temperatures recorded on the stage I I  units were within the limits even after the occur- 
rence of the earthquake. With a view to bringing unit 7 on line, it was started without realignment 
of the shaft. However, since the temperature had a rising tendency, the unit was stopped and the 
. . . .  } 
shaft reahgned. The babblt hmng of the generator, the upper and lower guide bearings and the 
turbine guide bearings were found to be in good condition. In general, the following maintenance 
works were carried out on stage I I  units : 
Unit 8--the upper guide bearing bracket was shifted and the shaft realigned. 
Unit 7--the upper bearing bridge lower guide bearing brackets were shifted and the shaft rea- 
ligned. 
Units 6 and 5--the upper bearing bracket was leveled with shims and shifted. The shaft.s were 
in central position, and hence, no detailed alignment of the shaft was deemed to be necessary. 
All eight turbine generators in the generating station had tripped by operation of the governor. 
The spherical valves had closed. All of the machines were stopped by the emergency-stopping 
procedure upon occurrence of the earthquake, except unit 2 which was stopped by normal proce- 
dure. Unit 7 was, however, stopped with full air brakes on, because of difficulty experienced with 
the brake jet due to auxiliary power failure. 
It  was observed that the dome lights of stage I units were shattered. The temperature r cords 
after the stoppage of the units on occurrence of the earthquake were satisfactory. The indication 
of low pressure and low oil level in the governor container for stage I units had picked up. This 
may have been due to the air pressure for the governor oil container having been somewhat lowered 
even before the earthquake. 
All the butterfly valves were open. However, butterfly valve 1 appeared to have closed and 
opened again, for reasons which cannot be elucidated. In general, all the equipment in the emer- 
gency valve house was in normal condition. 
Immediately on the occurrence of the earthquake, both the Bombay lines and the Karad line 
breakers had been tripped manually. All of the machines appeared to have tripped because of 
operation of relays and the machines were all in de-excited position. However, the sequence of 
tripping of the breakers is not known clearly, except in the case of the line breakers operated 
manually. 
After the operation of the breakers the 220-kv isolators of the stage I I  yard were opened out 
from the control room. The isolators of the stage I yard were opened manually an hour after the 
earthquake, the entire operation taking about ½ hr. During the opening of these switches, it was 
noticed that all of the three phases of the breakers on Bombay line 2 and generator 4 were in 
closed position as a result of underpressure of air. The isolating switches of stage I, including the 
switches for line 2 and generator 4 were opened manually, since by this time the feed from Ifandal- 
gaon had been isolated manually from that end. 
Because of the tripping of stage I units, the auxiliary supply to the units had failed. The feeder 
to the compressor stations of the 220-kv circuit-breaker compressors had tripped. A possible ex- 
planation is that, on the resumption of supply, two or more compressors may have tried to start 
simultaneously for which the setting of the relay may not have been adequate. The relays have 
since been set for 800 amps instead of 200 amps, in order to cover this contingency. 
It  is understood from ?¢[essr. Tata's engineers that, after the earthquake, it was found that in 
Tata's system one transformer had tripped as a result of zero sequence voltage, and another trans- 
former was tripped by Buchholz relay. Also a negative sequence alarm was given. 
There was an automatic losing of the 220-kv ABCB of unit 4, due to failure of compressed air. 
On the occurrence of the earthquake, the contingency of the breaker connecting the unit back 
to the system did not arise; the damage that would have been caused to these units, had this oc- 
curred, would have been enormous. 
The Neyrpic overspeed relays for stage I turbines are of the hand-reset type. It  may thus be 
concluded that the unit had tripped as a result of picking tip of overspeed relays. The stage I I  
Charmilles overspeed relay, incorporating mercury contacts was of the self-reset ype. In conse- 
quence, it cannot definitely be said whether the relay as a whole had initiated the tripping or 
whether the mercury contact alone had tripped the stage I I  units. The units of Koyna had been 
tested for overspeed and the devices had been set to trip at 25 per cent overspeed. The possibility 
of their tripping because of overspeed oes not, therefore, exist. It  may thus be concluded that the 
overspeed relays picked up because of the earthquake. On the stage I I  units there is another over- 
speed device fixed on the shaft at the governor floor. This device works on the deflection of a strip 
spring which comes into play when the speed exceeds apredetermined level. It  is of the hand-reset 
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type. It is interesting to note that there is no record of this having tripped at the time of the 
earthquake. 
SELECTED ~ECOMMENDATION S 
The maintenance and repair works carried out on generator units were of such a nature as to 
bring back the machines on line within the shortest possible time even though generator shaf~ 
alignment had to be carried out. The performance of the machines after the earthquake may be 
said to be satisfactory, the temperature cords being within the specified limits. When the align- 
ment of the shaft was being carried out after the earthquake, it was found that this work was 
comparatively difficult on the stage II units because of the type of guide bearing provided, The 
bearings are of the shell type, as distinct from the adjustable type provided in stage I. It is, there- 
fore, recommended that stage II generator units also be provided with a similar type of adjustable 
quick bearings. 
The oil pressure and oil level relays in the turbine governor system had picked up at the time 
of the earthquake, presumably because of lack of pressure prior to the occurrence of the earth- 
quake. This contingency should definitely be avoided, and the best course for this would be to 
check scrupulously the oil level and the pressure in the governor oil container to ensure that they 
are always kept up to the required value. As a normal procedure, it is further ecommended, that 
in the event of tripping of the turbine unit due to an earthquake, it should invariably be ensured, 
before restarting the unit, that bearing clearances are in order and that conjugation between 
needle and deflector is perfect. All of the bypasses and pipes of the oil and water circuits to the 
servomotors should be in perfect condition, and the level in the oil pressure container should also 
be normal. If possible, the level of the turbine runner should also be checked vis-a-vis the position 
of the nozzle, before starting the units. 
The latching mechanism for the counterweight of the butterfly valve, which keeps the valve 
in open position, was examined. In order to avoid any raM-operation of this mechanism and con- 
sequent closing of the butterfly vMve, it should be ensured that the latching mechanism is properly 
matched. 
Circuit breakers installed on future sets should not be provided with castors for the tank, as 
is the case in the stage I circuit breakers, The possiblity of removing the wheels from the existing 
circuit breakers may also be examined. It is interesting to note that more damage has been caused 
to stage 1 3500-MVA breakers than to the stage II breakers of 7500-MVA rupturing capacity. The 
latter type appears to be stronger mechanically. The fault study has shown that the breakers at 
Koyna should be of rupturing capacity greater than 5000 MVA. The replacement of the breakers 
of stage I which is in any case necessary, should be done without delay. 
There were a few cases of settling of the apparatus foundations, uch as those of the current 
transformer of Bombay line 1. Calculations for all foundations should take into account he as- 
eelerations due to earthquakes and, if necessary, the base of the foundation should in- 
clude strengthening by means of a suitable raft. It is possible that the damage to the circuit 
breaker and current ransformer foundations near the cable trench may have been caused by ad- 
verse effects of vibration, due to improperly compacted ground below. In the future, no heavy 
structure or heavy  load due to foundations of structures should be concentrated near excavations 
such as power  cable trenches, etc., since even under  ordinary monsoon conditions there is likely 
to be some seepage and  the foundations may have  a tendency to settle. The  vicinity of such 
trenches should be properly compacted  wi th  small aggregate before the foundations of the ap- 
paratus are laid, and  the foundations themselves should be strutted by  suitable piling to prevent 
unba lanced  settling. 
IY[odifieations carried out after the earthquake consisted of providing side supports for the mid-  
dle tier of battery racks. It is suggested that supports be added for the top tier, at suitable inter- 
vals throughout  its entire length. These  side supports should be anchored rigidly at several places. 
Wi th  regard to the battery station inside the powerhouse,  it is suggested that the racks be rigidly 
strutted to the walls and  ceiling at suitable points. It is suggested that the height of battery racks 
in future installations should be kept to a min imum and that their w id th  be increased. If possible, 
racks should be completely avoided and  the batteries laid at g round level. 
A few tube lamps  had  been thrown out by  the earthquake. It is suggested that the fixing ar- 
rangement  and  holders of the tube lamps  be changed to another type so that the lamps  will not be 
thrown out because of vibration. If the present type of lamp continues to be used, some fixing 
c lamps may be prov ided between the lamps  and  the fixtures as an additional measure  of safety. 
As  far as possible, tube lamps  should be supported f rom the ceiling with short suspensions. 
Since the present 220-kv breakers close on air failure and since these are hand-operated switches 
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(isolators), the following protection should be added. In the event of a trip impulse to the 220-kv 
breaker of any unit and simultaneous air failure developing on the same, arrangements should be 
made to trip all of the breakers in that section of the 220-kv swftchyard, including the junction 
breaker. Similarly, in the event of a trip impulse and simultaneous air failure on a line breaker, a 
trip impulse should be given by reliable and secure arrangement to all of the outgoing line break- 
ers at the far end of the section. Simultaneously, similar trip impulses hould be given to the unit 
breakers and the junction breaker. (In the event of air failure of the junction breaker together 
with a trip impulse, all of the breakers at Koyna will trip out.) The trip impulses mentioned above 
should cause three-phase opening and lock-out of the line breakers. 
The entire protective system is dependent on the maintenance and existence of a proper com- 
munication system. A carrier system is provided. This should be always in good repair and main- 
tenance, to provide channels for the transmission of tripping signals and essential orders. The 
carrier communication and the carrier protective quipment did not fail during or after the earth- 
quake. However, in the event of loss of carrier communication, it is very essential to have some 
suitable and dependable means of communication on which to rely. It  is therefore recommended 
that steps be taken to install a means of communication other than carrier, to act as a standby 
and be available for use in the event of loss of the carrier communication. 
During the earthquake the machines tripped as a result of mal-operation of the overspeed 
devices. This was a very chancy matter. In the event of a similar or near similar situation un- 
fortunately recurring, more positive means should be provided for safeguarding the station. I t  is 
therefore recommended that three separate aceelerographs (each capable of sensing acceleration 
in all three directions) should be installed at three suitable points and connected in such a way 
that in the event of any severe tremor occurring beyond a predetermined value, the indications 
of two two such accelerographs should initiate a tripping sequence to shut down the station com- 
pletely. The value at which such tripping should be initiated is tentatively recommended to be 
0.35 g, subject to further detailed examination with the suppliers of the generator equipment. 
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Physics of the Earth. F. D.  Stacey, John  Wi ley  and  Sons, New York,  1969, xi + 324 pp. (illus.) 
$11.95. 
The  10-year interval 1959 to 1969 has shown remarkab le  changes in our notions about  the struc- 
ture, the kinematics and  the dynamics  of the Earth's interior. The  notions of continental drift 
have changed f rom an ephemera l  vagary  to a plausible and tenable hypothesis. A t  least one 
mechan ism for the origin of the Earth's magnet ic  field has now been found. The  transition between 
the upper  and lower mant le  has been found to be a succession of at least two  major  steps, believed 
to be po lymorph ic  transitions. The  notions of global plate tectonics provide an explanation for 
the geographic distribution of ear thquake loci, and  a mode l  for the occurrence of deep focus earth- 
quakes  is now available. The  advent  of satellite geodesy has given definitive information about  
the figure of the Earth, wi th  its consequent  bearing on such notions as viscosity in the interior 
and  with its further implications regarding convection. The  observations of the free oscillations 
in the Chi lean and  A laskan  earthquakes have led to estimates of densities and  seismic velocities 
independent  of the estimates f rom Adams-Wi ] l iamson theory operating on travel-time data. 
The  above  truncated catalog indicates that this decade has been a truly unusual  one in the his- 
tory of science. I have started my decade with the year 1959 because it was  in that year that Guten-  
berg's The Physics of the Earth's Interior was published. The  successors to Gutenberg's  book  in 
the I0 years since it appeared have  been, in the main,  recapitulations of the master's. 
Stacey's book  is the first to provide a summary  of the new discoveries and  of the new models  
for the Earth's internal structure and constitution. The  coverage is thorough and  yet succinct 
enough for the new ideas to be conveyed in a vo lume as small as this one. Stacey shows  himself 
to be an avid yet selective reader, in the best tradition of Gutenberg.  On ly  the original contribu- 
tions of the latter to the earlier vo lume are absent in this case. 
Nevertheless, the book  is an excellent exposition of modern  geophysical lore. I have no hesita- 
tion in recommending  it for use as a text appropriate for a class of first-year graduate students. It 
is the best thing that has been done of its kind and warmly  deserves reading by  students of 
geophysics, whether  of the c lassroom variety or not. It is an important  addition to any bookshelf. 
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